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Abstract This article studies the behaviour of a firm searching to fill a vacancy.
The main assumption is that the firm can offer two different kinds of contracts to the
workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one. The short-term contract
acts as a probationary stage in which the firm can learn about the worker. After this
stage, the firm can propose a long-term contract to the worker or it can decide to
look for another worker. We show that, if the short-term wage is fixed endoge-
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1 Introduction
The share of temporary work in total employment has been increasing in Europe in
recent years. For instance, in the OECD, temporary employment as a proportion of
dependent employment has grown from 11.2% in 1998 to 12.3% in 2008. This
evolution has not been homogeneous across countries. Thus, since 1998 the share of
temporary workers has increased in some nations such as Germany and France and
decreased in others like the UK and Spain.1
Short-term contracts are often considered a measure of labour market flexibility.
They make the returns to entrepreneurial activities less dependent of institutional
rigidities such as employment restrictive legislation and trade union activity. In
addition, short-term contracts can be viewed as a screening device. In this
perspective, job matches can be interpreted as an experience good, in the tradition of
Jovanovic (1979, 1984). Accordingly, firms would use a short-term contract as a
probationary period, allowing them to select the right worker for the job.
In spite of this hypothesis, there is not a clear consensus at the empirical level
about the impact of temporary contracts on employment and welfare, notwith-
standing the fact that most of these papers apply a similar econometric framework: a
discrete-time proportional hazard model that relates the transition from temporary to
permanent employment to a number of individual and job-specific characteristics;
see, among others, Gu¨el and Petrongolo (2007) and Dolado et al. (2002) for Spain,
Gagliarducci (2005) for Italy, Salvanes (1997) for seven OECD countries, Booth
et al. (2002) for Britain and D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) for the European
Community. Thus, Booth et al. (2002) and Salvanes (1997) find evidence that
flexible labour markets facilitate the transition to permanent work while the
evidence is mixed for D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) who find that very short
contracts provide higher chances of labour market exclusion, Gu¨el and Petrongolo
(2007) who estimate that conversion rates from transitory to permanent employment
are below 10% and Dolado et al. (2002) who observe that temporary works in Spain
are highly persistent during the 90s despite several reforms attempting to reduce it.
Gagliarducci (2005) finds that the duration of temporary contracts increases the
probability of obtaining a permanent job but, in turns, this probability is a
decreasing function of the number of interruptions in the short-term contracts.2
The aim of this paper is to propose a theoretical model in order to understand the
factors influencing the impact of temporary contracts on employment and welfare
by analyzing the behavior of a firm searching to fill a vacancy under a short-term
contract and a long-term one. More specifically, we construct a model with
heterogeneous workers and homogeneous firms. Each firm has two possibilities:
either it offers only long-term contracts (LTCs) or it offers a short-term contract
(STC) to begin with, eventually switching to a long-term one if it is satisfied with
the productivity of the job-workers pairs. We assume that firms offer a long-term
1 See OECD (2009) for a more detailed information of the evolution of temporary contracts in OECD
countries.
2 Additional to this, a recent paper by Ederveen and Thissen (2007) for the new EU member states finds
that the impact of the rigidity of labor market instituions on unemployment is mixing.
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wage for the job and that workers either take it or leave it. In this model, we assume
that the short-term wage is fixed exogenously, whatever the worker type. The
implication of this assumption is analyzed in the last section, where we evaluate the
case where the short-term wage is set by the firms.3
We show that, when short-term wage is exogenous and sufficiently high, STCs
can be optimal for both firms and social welfare. This is because a high short-term
wage pushes every worker to accept a STC. Through these contracts, firms will be
able to screen workers thereby hiring only the most qualified on a long-term basis.
From a social welfare viewpoint, the screening has a negative impact on
employment. However, such adverse effect, can be compensated by a higher
productive efficiency.
When firms are posting the short-term wages (and we allow firms to use
contingent wages), in equilibrium, STC may be optimal for the firms. STCs are
profitable only if the costs arising from he probability of being unmatched are
compensated by the surplus from the long-term matching. The higher the workers.
unemployment benefits, the lower the surplus that can be obtained by waiting to find
a good worker. However, in this case STCs are never optimal from a welfare
viewpoint.
Moreover, we show that the regime with fixed short-term wage dominates, in
terms of welfare, the regime with posted short-term wage, provided that the short-
term wage exceeds a threshold value.
We also establish that, when the short-term wage is exogenously given, the STC
wage is higher that the LTC one, which is equal to the worker’s reservation wage
given the income received when unemployed. This is because unemployment
benefits are the outside option for workers faced with a STC. Similarly, the
exogenous short-term wage is the outside option of a worker faced with a LTC.
In determining the optimal firms’ behaviour, an important role is played by the
short-term wage. We will mostly focus on the more interesting and relevant case
when this salary is exogenously given. The last section of the paper will summarize
the result for the case when firms also set the salary.
Our model shares some similarities with Wasmer (1999) and Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002),4 who have introduced temporary jobs in matching models based on
the classic equilibrium models of the labour market, built on Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (2000).
Unlike this article, they concentrate on the macroeconomic effect of STCs.
Wasmer (1999) shows that, in a model with exogenous job destruction, firms are
more willing to use STCs, in periods of low growth, and that this increases
employment. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) show that, in a model with
endogenous job destruction, the combination of temporary jobs and firing
restrictions may be both inefficient in terms of aggregate welfare and inadequate
3 The implications of exogenous wages on economic performance have already been analysed by Zagler
(2005). In his model, endogenous salaries obtained from the bargaining process between individual firms
and unions could generate a distorted remuneration system that pays too much to the innovation sector
and too little to the existing stock of knowledge. Zagler (2005) suggests that optimal salaries may be
obtained from centralized wage pacts and not by government policy.
4 See also Paolini (2007).
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as a weapon to fight unemployment. Their results follows from the fact that the
share of temporary jobs transformed into permanent jobs is decreasing in the level
of firing costs.
The model is formally introduced in Sect. 2. Sections 3, 4 and 5, study the
optimal contract choice, present the main results and analyzes the welfare effects
with exogenous short-term wages. Section 6 analyzes the main results and the
welfare effects when these wages are endogenous. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Workers and firms
Workers are characterized by a real-value parameter defining the worker’s type, x,
distributed according to a continuous distribution function F(x) with full support on
[0,1]. Its density denoted by f(x).
Time is discrete and t ¼ 0; 1; . . .þ1: b is the probability that a worker leaves
the market (‘‘dies’’) when going from period t to period (t ? 1). We assume that, in
each period, new workers enter the market. Their types are distributed so that the
actual distribution of live workers is time-invariant, i.e., a worker of type x enters
the market if and only if a worker of type x dies. This is a strong assumption, but it
allows to keep the analysis sufficiently simple. The main results of the paper are
independent of it.
In each period firms and workers meet. Firms offer a job-contract pair and
workers can either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, production
takes place. At the end of the period, wages are paid and output is sold.
As in Albrecht and Axel (1984), we assume that workers can earn different levels
of income when unemployed,5 b(x). However, while Albrecht and Axel (1984)
assume that homogenous workers can have just two possible levels of unemploy-
ment incomes, here we assume that there is a continuum of unemployment income
levels, depending on workers’ types. More precisely, we assume that unemployment
income is proportional to the worker’s type, i.e., that b(x) = cx, with c [ [0,1].
We assume that the number of homogenous firms is higher than the number of
workers, M [ N. At each moment in time, a firm can have either a filled position or
a vacancy. An active firm with a filled position employs one worker and obtains
revenue by selling its output.
If the position is filled, an exogenous layoff arrives at each period with
probability b (this is because in each period t, a matched worker dies with
probability b). Moreover, we assume that, if a firm leaves the market, another firm
enters the market.
For simplicity, for each firm, the production function is:
Y ¼ f ðxÞ ¼ xy ð1Þ
5 It can be interpreted as including the value of leisure and home production, net of search costs. This
wide notion of unemployment income also justifies the assumption that benefits are related to the type of
worker.
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where x is the type of the worker and y the technology of the homogenous firms. To
simplify notation, we set y = 1.
If there is a vacancy, in each t, firms can create a position without cost. At each
meeting in the search market, firms are not able to observe the type of the worker
(hence, their unemployment income). We allow firms to offer a probationary
contract (lasting one period) to the workers. During this period, firms learn their
workers’ type and decide whether or not to offer them a long-term contract.
All the agents (firms and workers) have a common discount factor, denoted
0 d 1. Impatience also captures search costs.
2.2 Search and matching
Total employment is Na ¼ Nð1  uaÞ, where N is the labour force and ua the
unemployment rate. These values depend on a, the firm’s choice of the contract.6
Unemployed workers are matched with the recruiting firms according to a simple
random matching technology, a, that is assumed to be independent of the number of
participants in the search market.
The rate at which firms find an unemployed worker, denoted q, will depend on a,
the matching technology, and on ua and va (unemployment and vacancy rate). We
simply assume that q is a fixed proportion of the unemployment/vacancy ratio.7
Hence,
q ¼ a Nu
Mv
:
2.3 Optimal firm behaviour
In determining the optimal firm behaviour, an important role is played by the short-
term wage wO. We will mostly focus on the more interesting and relevant case when
wO is exogenously given, for instance because is fixed by law.
The last section of the paper will summarize the result for the case when firms
also post wO. Here we treat the short term wage wO as exogenous.
For a firm, the policy, a, is the choice of the contract to offer to the workers. We
assume that it is impossible for a firm to fire a worker before the expiration of the
contract (or that to fire a worker is infinitely costly).
The firm has two policy options:
(L) It supplies a long-term employment contract at a wage rate wL(x), contingent
on the type (a = L).
(SL) It supplies a short-term (one-period) contract to begin with, switching,
possibly, in the following period, to a long-term employment contract at a wage
rate wSL(x), contingent on the type (a = SL).
6 We give the definition of contract, a, in the next section.
7 Given that M [ N, evidently v [ u.
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The advantage of the latter option is that the firm will have full information about
the worker’s type when it offers him/her the long-term contract. Note also that the
permanent contract under the first policy is equivalent to a temporary one with an
option to remain in employment; see for example Booth et al. (2000). Thus, a
permanent contract is contingent on wages and the key difference between this and
a temporary one is that workers cannot be fired.
Contracts are chosen by the firm so as to maximize its profit subject to the
participation of workers, corresponding to the expected utility of a worker not
accepting the contract.
Let
VaðxÞ ¼ bðxÞ þ dð1  bÞ aWaðxÞ þ ð1  aÞVaðxÞ½  ð2Þ
be the expected utility of a type-x unemployed where a [ {L, SL}, x [ [0, 1] and
(1 - b) is the probability that the worker will survive to the next period.
An (L) policy is fully characterized by a wage rate w, meaning that a worker of
type x will receive a wage wL(x). The expected utility for a worker is implicitly
defined by
WLðxÞ ¼ wLðxÞ þ dð1  bÞWLðxÞ: ð3Þ
Given our simple matching technology (and the assumption M [ N), where a is the
probability that a workers receives a job offer, a worker accepts it if and only if
WLðxÞVaðxÞ. Let qL be the (measurable) subset of workers accepting the contract.
An (SL) contract is fully characterized by a short-term wage w0, a long-term
wage rate wSL(x) and a subset r of workers for which the firm is willing to extend
the contractual relation over the long-period. The expected utility for a worker is
implicitly defined by
WSLðxÞ ¼ w0 þ dð1  bÞVSLðxÞ; if x 62 r;w0 þ dð1  bÞWLðx;wÞ if x 2 r

: ð4Þ
Clearly, a worker accepts if and only if WSLðxÞVSLðxÞ. Let q SL be the
(measurable) subset of workers accepting the contract.
2.3.1 The firm policy choice problem
Knowing w0; wSLðxÞ; wLðxÞ; r and w0 we can define the problem firms’ policy
choice.
Let J(x) be the expected profit of firm with a long-term contract, that is,
JðxÞ ¼ x  waðxÞð Þ þ dð1  bÞJðxÞ
where a [ {L, SL} and wa(x) is the long-term wage that, by hypothesis, is posted by
firms and that workers either take or leave.
Moreover, let PL denote the expected discounted payoff of a firm searching to fill
a vacancy with a policy L, with probability (1 - q), that it does not succeed and it
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will try again to match in the next period. If the firm decides to offer directly a LTC
(a = L), it will hire, by hypothesis, every worker.
PL ¼ q
Z
x2qL
JðxÞf ðxÞdx þ d 1  q
Z
x2qL
f ðxÞdx
2
64
3
75PLðw0Þ ð5Þ
where qL is the (measurable) subset of workers accepting the contract.
And, let PSL denote the expected discounted payoff of a firm searching to fill a
vacancy. Given the short-term wage w0, the expected profit of the firm is
max
r
PSL ¼ q
Z
x2qSL
x  w0ð Þf ðxÞdx þ qdð1  bÞ
Z
x2rSL\qSL
JðxÞf ðxÞdx
þ d 1  q
Z
x2qSL
f ðxÞdx þ qdð1  bÞ
Z
x 62rSL\qSL
f ðxÞdx
2
64
3
75PSL
ð6Þ
(notice that, given the continuity of the distribution function, single points have zero
probability of occurrence).
The first term is the one-period expected profit from a short-term job, as the
contract will be accepted by workers of the subset qSL; the second term is the
expected profit from an extension to a long-term contract, which occurs only for
types in the subset rSL; the third term collects all cases in which the firm supplies
again a short-term contract, either because the the matching was unsuccessful, or
because the short-term contract was rejected, or because the firm refuses to extend
the contract to permanent position.
If the firm chooses to start with a STC, a = SL, during the probationary stage, it
will learn the worker’s type. In this stage, the worker will receive a short-term wage:
wO. In period 2, the firm will propose a LTC only to the workers in the subset rSL.
Given that the firm learns the worker’s type, future wages will be contingent on the
worker’s type: wa ¼ wSLðxÞ.
The firm maximizes its profits by choosing policy SL if PSL PL, otherwise
policy L will be optimal.
3 Optimal contract choice
We study the optimal contract choice in four steps:
(a) we determine the subset of workers (qL; qSL) accepting the contract proposed.
To this end we need to determine the wages;
(b) we determine the subset of workers (rSL) accepted by firm after a short-term
contract;
(c) we determine the unemployment rates;
(d) we find the optimal contract choice.
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3.1 Wage posting
The profit maximizing firm chooses the wage subject to WaðxÞVaðxÞ, with
a [ {L, SL}. Since the firm has no incentive to offer workers anything over and
above the minimum required to make him/her to accept its offer (see Diamond
(1971)), this condition reduces to
Wa ¼ Va: ð7Þ
Let’s first consider an (L) policy. In this simple wage setting set-up, the condition
(7), where WL is given by (3) and VL is given by (2), implies that wL is driven to the
worker’s reservation wage:
wLðxÞ ¼ bðxÞ ¼ cx: ð8Þ
Notice that wL is type-contingent. This implies that the subset of workers
accepting the contract, qL, is the full support [0,1]. Also, observe that, even with
type-contingent wages, firms would rather hire high productivity (and highly paid)
workers because, per period, their profits are (1 - c)x.
Consider an (SL) policy. Condition (7), where WSL is given by (4) and VL is given
by (2), immediately implies that the long-term wage associated with SL is8
wSLðxÞ ¼ cx þ adð1  bÞwO
1 þ adð1  bÞ ð9Þ
Proposition 1 Under the maintained assumptions, given wO, all the workers with
x [ (x?,1] always reject the STC. For all the workers with x 2
½0; xþÞ; wO wSLðxÞ bðxÞ; where xþ ¼ wOc .
Proof To establish the first proposition, observe that workers with x [ r SL will
accept a SL if and only if WSLðxÞ[ VSLðxÞ where WSL(x) and VSL are implicitly
given by (4) and (2). By (9), the previous inequality is satisfied if and only if
wO [ b(x) = cx. Hence, all the workers with x [ (x
?, 1], with xþ ¼ wOc , will always
reject the short-term contract. Given that, for all the workers accepting the
SL, wO [ b(x), the second claim follows immediately from (9). h
This result is of some interest. Due to the assumption b(x) = cx, when wO is
exogenous, high productivity workers will reject short-term contracts, unless wO is
sufficiently high. However, high levels of wO also imply high levels of wSL(x). This
trade-off may make STC less profitable than LTC. The result is coherent with the
wage formation theories suggesting that temporary workers are paid more than
workers in long-term contract to compensate them for the less advantageous
characteristics of temporary jobs. Moreover, in our model, the long-term wage
obtained after a short-term contract (i.e., after the firm observes the type of the
worker) is not driven to the worker’s reservation wage. This is because, for the
workers, the STC is an outside option: if the long-term wage is equal to the
reservation wage, the worker will reject the firm’s proposal and wait for the next
STC proposal.
8 Notice that this is only a hypothetical wage, as the firm will extend the contract only to workers in r.
8 Empirica (2012) 39:1–18
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3.2 Search equilibrium in the STC case
Knowing that only workers with x [ [0, x?) will always accept the short-term
contract, the firm’s strategy in the SL policy is to engage only workers in the set rSL
after the probationary stage. Hence, for the stationary strategy profile (rSL), we
define the expected payoff of a firm as PSL. We focus on equilibria in undominated
strategies, where a firm accepts a worker of type x if and only if JSLðxÞ[ PSL.
Proposition 2 The optimal SLðx; xþÞis given by rSL ¼ ðx; xþ;where x ¼
qd2ð1bÞ
R xþ
x xf ðxÞdxÞ
R 1
x f ðxÞdx
D
C
 
þð1dð1bÞÞC qd
R xþ
0
xf ðxÞdxw0
 h i
1dþqEdqd2ð1bÞ½  ; while x
þ ¼ wOc ; E is the
probability to meet a worker in the set ½0; xþÞ; C ¼ 1cþqdð1bÞ
1þqdð1bÞ and D ¼ qdð1bÞwO1þqdð1bÞ.
Proof See Appendix 1. h
Proposition 2 characterizes the search equilibrium in the case of STCs. In this
equilibrium, firms partition workers who have accepted the short-term contract, into
two subintervals, hiring permanently forever only workers whose ability is above
the threshold x-.9
An increase in wO has a double effect on the economy. First, given that x
þ ¼ wOc ,
it increases the proportion of workers accepting a STC (and this has a positive effect
on E). Second, it pushes up the long-term wage wSL, as we can see from (9).
To better understand this result, it is instructive to consider a simple example, where
abilities are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], N = M, q = a = 0.8, c = 0.5, d = 0.8,
and b = 0.05. The next figure shows how the interval of workers accepting and
accepted in the long-term job (i.e., with x [ [(x?) - (x -)]) varies with wO.
If wO is low, the first one of the two effects discussed above dominates the
second: only some workers accept a STC (x? is low). On the other hand, firms are
not very selective in screening the workers (x- is low). When wO is higher, the
opposite is true: x? takes a value near 1 (i,e., every worker accepts the STC), and x-
is also high (because the long-term wage is so high that firms only find it profitable
to engage highly qualified workers). (Fig. 1)
3.3 Unemployment
In order to determine the unemployment rate, under the SL policy, we shall consider
unemployment rates for workers with x x (similarly for utx\x\xþ and utx xþ).
Also, let’s index with pSL
t the proportion of workers engaged in a STC.
Given the policy SL, the expected value of utx\x\xþ , evolves over time
according to:
9 Remember, however, that all the workers with x 2 ðwoc ; 1 will always reject the STC.
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utþ1x\x\xþ ¼ utx\x\xþð1  bÞð1  aÞ þ b
ptx\x\xþ ¼ ut1x\x\xþð1  bÞa
because a fraction a of the unemployed who survive (with a probability (1 - b)) at t
is expected to get a job, a fraction b of them is expected to die and to be replaced by
a fraction b of the work force with x 2 ½x; xþ (these individuals are necessarily
unemployed in the first period of their life, given the time structure of the model).
Hence, the unique stationary state occurs at
ux\x\xþ ¼ bað1  bÞ þ b ð10Þ
and
px\x\xþ ¼ ux\x\xþð1  bÞa: ð11Þ
Similarly, for workers with x x, the dynamics are described by.
utþ1x x ¼ utx xð1  bÞð1  aÞ þ ptx xð1  bÞð1  aÞ þ b
and
ptx x ¼ ut1x xð1  bÞa
The difference with respect to the previous case reflects the share of people
employed at t in a STC that, given that x x, become unemployed (if still alive) at
(t ? 1).
Hence, the unique stationary state is described by
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
wo
x+-x-
x+
x-
Fig. 1 The interval of workers accepting/accepted in the long-term job
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ux x ¼ ba2ð1  bÞ þ b ð12Þ
px x ¼ ux xð1  bÞa ð13Þ
Obviously, the unemployment rate of the workers with x xþ, is always 1, because
they never accept employment.
Total unemployment is:
uSL ¼ Fðxþ  xÞux\x\xþ þ FðxÞux x þ Fð1  xþÞ ð14Þ
with a percentage p ¼ Fðxþ  xÞpx\x\xþ þ FðxÞpx x of workers are engaged
in a one period contract.
Substituting (10) and (12) in (14), we find the value of the total unemployment:
uSL ¼ 1  að1  bÞað1  bÞ þ b Fðx
þÞ  bð1  aÞ
a2ð1  bÞ þ bFðx
Þ
 
ð15Þ
where the endogenous values x? and x- are given respectively by the Propositions 1
and 2.
Looking again at the numerical example above (see Fig. 2), the unemployment
rate is decreasing in wO if wO \ c. After this point it starts increasing. When
wO = c, x
? = 1, and so all the agents accept the temporary employment
proposition. After this point, the increase of the short and, consequently, of the
long-term wages pushes the firms to hire permanently only the most productive
agent to compensate for the high cost of labour.
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
wo
Unemployment
Temporary Employment
Employment
Fig. 2 Unemployment, employment and temporary employment
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We now turn to the analysis of the unemployment rate with the strategy L. Given
the strategy L, uL
t is expected to evolve according to:
utþ1L ¼ utLð1  bÞð1  aÞ þ b:
Hence, a stationary state occurs if and only if
uL ¼ bð1  bÞaþ b ð16Þ
It easy to check that uL  uSL. This is because, in policy SL, firms screen workers
and engage long-term contracts only workers in the interval ðx; xþÞ. On the
contrary, if a = L, this interval is the full support [0,1].
4 Choice of the contract
Studying now the optimal contract choice: Policy SL is an optimal contract if
PSL [ PL, where PSL is defined in Appendix 1 by the Eq. 21, and, PL may be
rewritten, from the Eq. 5 above, as:
PL ¼
qdð1  bÞð1  cÞ R 1
0
xf ðxÞdx
1  ð1  bÞd½  1  ð1  qÞd½ 
Looking again at the numerical example (see Fig. 3), a = SL is the firms’optimal
contract if and only if wO takes a value near c.
For wO less than c, the more qualified workers will refuse to work. For wO near c,
all qualified workers accept a short-term contract. This value of wO implies a high
level of wSL but the high wages are compensated because firms can screen the
workers in the first period. For wO near 1, the screening cannot compensate the high
wages and STC is suboptimal.
-0,9
-0,8
-0,7
-0,6
-0,5
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
SL
- E L
wo
Π Π
Fig. 3 Firms’ optimal contract choice
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5 Welfare
We define welfare in terms of the present discounted value of output. The social
planner is not interested in wages, since wages determine only the distribution of
output and, by assumption, distributional considerations are excluded from the
social welfare function. In our model, the critical issue is the firms’ policy choice.
We need to check if and when a SL policy can be optimal for both the firms and the
social planner. We define as Xa the welfare value with a = SL, L.
The value function of the planner, with a = L, satisfies the equation
XL ¼
Xþ1
t¼0
dtN ð1  uLÞ
Z1
0
xf ðxÞdx þ uLðcÞ
Z1
0
xf ðxÞdx
2
4
3
5 ð17Þ
where uL is given by (16).
With a = SL, it satisfies the equation
XSL ¼
Xþ1
t¼0
dtN FðxÞð1  ux\xÞ
Zx
0
xf ðxÞdx þ ðFðxþÞ  FðxÞÞð1  ux\x\xþÞ
2
4

Zxþ
x
xf ðxÞdx þ FðxÞðux\xÞc
Zx
0
xf ðxÞdx þ ðFðxþÞ  FðxÞÞðux\x\xþÞc

Zxþ
x
xf ðxÞdx þ ð1  FðxþÞÞðcÞ
Z1
xþ
xf ðxÞdx
3
5 ð18Þ
where ux\x\xþ is given by (10), while ux z is given by (12). In each period, only
workers with type x\x\xþ will be hired on LTC. On the contrary, workers with
x x will be hired exclusively on STC.
We need to check when
XSL XL ð19Þ
Obviously the result depends upon the distribution F(.) and the values of the
parameters.
In our numerical example (see Fig. 4), an SL policy is optimal when the short-
term wage is fixed at a value sufficiently high, so that x? = 1, i.e., so that all the
workers enter the market for temporary jobs. In this case, the higher unemployment
rate resulting from the firms’ screening is compensated by the higher productive
efficiency. Workers in the subset [0, x-) will be always rejected by firms after the
short-term contract. These workers will face a higher unemployment rate,
nevertheless in the short-term relation they will obtain a wage wO larger then
their productivity.
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6 Posted short-term wage
Let’s now assume that the firm can also post the wage of the STC. The associated
long-term wage is given by Eq. 8. When firms meet a worker for the first time, they
don’t know his type. We assume that the firm can choose to offer a (short-term) two-
part wage. This wage would be wO ¼ ~wðxÞ þ ðwðxÞ  ~wðxÞÞ½ , where ~wðxÞ is the
fixed component, while w(x) is contingent upon the type of the worker (which the
firm will discover only at the end of the period). Hence, the firm will pay a salary
wð~xÞ independent of the worker type, and, at the end of the period (after learning the
type), it will pay a ‘‘bonus’’ equal to the difference between the worker’s type and x,
i.e., ½wðxÞ  ~wðxÞ. From the proof of Lemma 1, it follows that a worker will accept
a STC only if the expected utility of accepting this proposal is larger than the one of
rejecting it. Therefore, if wO þ dWSLx
 
[ VSLx .
Clearly, at the equilibrium, given that types are distributed on [0,1], the
equilibrium value of ~wðxÞ will be 0 and w(x) = cx. Hence, wages on long-term
contracts (signed after the trial stage) and short-term wage are both driven to the
worker’s reservation wage:
wSL ¼ wO ¼ bðxÞ ð20Þ
Notice that, with a two-part wage, all the workers (also the high productivity ones
with x 2 ðwOc ; 1Þ will enter the short-term market.
The main result for the case of endogenous short-term wage is summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 When wO is endogenous, firms only hire workers in the
interval(z, 1], where z ¼
qd dð1bÞ
R 1
z
ðxzÞf ðxÞdx
 
þð1dð1bÞÞ
R 1
0
xf ðxÞdx
 h i
1dþqdqd2ð1bÞ
Fig. 4 Welfare comparison
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Proof See Appendix 2. h
If wO is endogenous, as we have seen wSL ¼ wO (see Eq. 20 above). In this case,
every worker accepts a short-term contract offer. Moreover, firms will select only
the agents in the subset (z, 1] for the long term work relation.
Looking again at the numerical example above, we find that usl ¼ 29%; p ¼
4; 7% and z = 0.46. Compared to the case of endogenous wO, the rate of
unemployment is lower only when wO is close to c. Moreover, we find that a = SL
is always optimal.
For the case of uniform distribution on [0,1], it is straightforward to check that
total welfare always attains a maximum with policy L. With a SL policy, firms
screen workers. The screening process has a negative effect on unemployment and
this generates a higher search cost. This effect could be compensated from the
viewpoint of the workers on short-term contracts, because wO [ wL However, by
definition, this is irrelevant from a social welfare viewpoint.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that the introduction of a market for temporary labour contracts
affects negatively unemployment and positively the productivity efficiency of firms.
The positive impact compensates the negative one only if short-term wages are fixed
exogenously at a sufficiently high value.
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Appendix 1: Search equilibrium on the SL policy with wO exogenous
Proof of Proposition 2: First, observe that the set X of workers that the firm accepts
in SL contract is always an interval (x?, 1], some x?. Indeed, by the definition of
undominated equilibrium, x
1dð1bÞ[ dP
SLðxÞ. Hence for any x0 [ x;
x0
1dð1bÞ  dPSL.
When wO is fixed exogenously, by Proposition 1, all the workers with x 2 ðwOc ; 1
will always reject the STC.
Thus, the search problem faced by the firm may be rewritten, from (6) above, as:
max PSL ¼
j qdð1  bÞ R x
0
xf ðxÞdx  w0
 	 
þ qd2ð1  bÞ2 ðR xþx xf ðxÞdxÞ  Ewsl
h i
j 1  dð1  qEÞ  qd2ð1  bÞð1  R 1xþ f ðxÞdxÞ
h i
or
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max PSL ¼
j qdð1  bÞ R x
0
xf ðxÞdx  w0
 	 
þ qd2ð1  bÞ2 CðR xþx xf ðxÞdxÞ  D
h i
j 1  dþ qEd qd2ð1  bÞð1  R 1xþ f ðxÞdxÞ
h i
ð21Þ
where j ¼ ð1  dð1  bÞÞ; Ewsl ¼ cð
R xþ
x xf ðxÞdxÞþadð1bÞwO
1þadð1bÞ ; x
þ ¼ wOc ; E is the proba-
bility to meet a worker in the set [0, x?).
C ¼ 1  cþ adð1  bÞ
1 þ adð1  bÞ and D ¼
adð1  bÞwO
1 þ adð1  bÞ:
The first-order conditions with respect to x- are given by
 xf ðxÞCqd2ð1  bÞ2ð1  dð1  bÞÞ
 1  dþ qEd qd2ð1  bÞð1 
Z1
x
f ðxÞdxÞ
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
þ qd2ð1  bÞf ðxÞð1  dð1  bÞÞ qd2ð1  bÞ2 Cð
Zxþ
x
xf ðxÞdxÞ  D
2
4
3
5
2
4
þð1  dð1  bÞÞ qdð1  bÞ
Zxþ
0
xf ðxÞdx  w0
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
3
5 ¼ 0
or
x ¼
qd2ð1  bÞ Rx
þ
x
xf ðxÞdxÞ  R1
x
f ðxÞdx  DC
 !
þ jC qd
Rxþ
0
xf ðxÞdx  w0
 !" #
1  dþ qEd qd2ð1  bÞ	 

ð22Þ
To check that the solution is unique, observe that the left-hand side of Eq. 22 is
increasing in x-, with range (0,1). On the other hand, the right-hand side of Eq. 22 is
decreasing in x-, falling from
qd2ð1  bÞ R xþx xf ðxÞdxÞ  R 1x f ðxÞdx  DC
 
þ jC qd
R xþ
0
xf ðxÞdx  w0
 h i
1  dþ qEd qd2ð1  bÞ	 

to
qd2ð1bÞ DCð ÞþjC qd
R xþ
0
xf ðxÞdxw0
 h i
1dþqEdqd2ð1bÞ½  . Hence a unique solution to (22) exists.
Appendix 2: Search equilibrium on the SL policy with wO endogenous
Proof of Proposition 3: As in the Proof of Proposition 1, the search problem faced by
the firm may be rewritten as
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max PSL ¼
j qdð1  bÞð1  cÞ R 1
0
xf ðxÞdx
 h i
þ qd2ð1  bÞ2 ð1  cÞðR 1z xf ðxÞdxÞ
h i
j 1  dð1  qÞ  qd2ð1  bÞð1  R 1z f ðxÞdxÞ
 
where j = (1 - d(1 - b)) with wSL ¼ wO ¼ cx.
The first-order conditions with respect to z are given by
 zf ðzÞqd2ð1  bÞ2ð1  cÞ
 ð1  dð1  bÞÞ 1  dþ qd qd2ð1  bÞð1 
Z1
z
f ðxÞdxÞ
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
þ qd2ð1  bÞf ðzÞð1  dð1  bÞÞ qd2ð1  bÞ2ð1  cÞ ð
Z1
z
xf ðxÞdxÞ
2
4
3
5
2
4
þ 1  dð1  bÞð Þ qdð1  bÞð1  cÞ
Z1
0
xf ðxÞdx
0
@
1
A
0
@
1
A
3
5 ¼ 0
or
z ¼ qd
1  dþ qd qd2ð1  bÞ dð1  bÞ
Z1
z
ðx  zÞf ðxÞdx
0
@
1
Aþ j
Z1
0
xf ðxÞdx
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
ð23Þ
To check that the solution is unique, observe that the left-hand side of Eq. 23 is
increasing in z, with range (0,1). On the other hand, the right-hand side of Eq. 23 is
decreasing in z, falling from
qd
1  dþ qd qd2ð1  bÞ dð1  bÞ
Z1
0
ðx  zÞf ðxÞdx
0
@
1
Aþ j
Z1
0
xf ðxÞdx
0
@
1
A
2
4
3
5
to qd
1dþqdqd2ð1bÞ j
R 1
0
xf ðxÞdx
 h i
: Hence a unique solution to (23) exists.
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